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I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1990, three same-sex couples applied for mar-
riage licenses with Hawaii's Department of Health. Not surpris-
ingly, the Department of Health denied the applications because
the couples were of the same sex, even though, in all other re-
spects, they were fully qualified to obtain the licenses. Rather than
simply walking away, disappointed that the state would not formally
and legally recognize their commitments to each other, Ninia
Baehr, Genora Dancel, Tammy Rodrigues, Antoinette Pregil, Pat
Logan and Joseph Melillo went to court. The state of marriage in
this country, at least as it has traditionally been known, may never
be the same.
The simple fact that these three same-sex couples applied for
and were denied marriage licenses was not in itself newsworthy. It
had happened before, and it would undoubtedly happen again.
Neither was their institution of a lawsuit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the state's marriage laws groundbreaking. That ground
had been broken twenty years earlier, in Minnesota, by Richard
John Baker and James Michael McConnell,' and repeated by other
3couples in other states over the years. Unlike their predecessors,
however, the Hawaii same-sex marriage applicants would succeed
in convincing their state supreme court that Hawaii's marriage
laws, as applied to same-sex couples, were presumptively unconsti-
tutional under Hawaii's rather unique Equal Protection Clause, re-
quiring the application of strict scrutiny.4 For the first time, the na-
tion truly sat up and took notice.
Three years later, following a trial on the merits, the First Cir-
cuit Court of Hawaii, the Honorable Kevin C. Chang presiding,
concluded that the state had failed to show that its prohibition of
same-sex marriage was justified by a compelling state interest and
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional
rights.5 This time, the nation panicked. Congress and a vast major-
1. For a discussion of the history, purpose and benefits of marriage, see
Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv.
539 (1991).
2. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, No. Civ. A. 90-13892, 1992 WL
685364 (D.C. Super. June 2, 1992), affd per curiam, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
4. SeeBaehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
5. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
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ity of the states' legislatures rushed to enact special, unprecedented
legislation, specifically defining marriage as a union between per-
sons of the opposite sex, specifically prohibiting marriage between
persons of the same sex, and voidinq recognition of same-sex mar-
riages lawfully performed elsewhere. Minnesota was one of those
7
states.
To many persons, the concept of same-sex marriage is an
oxymoron because marriage is, by its very definition, a relationship
between persons of different sexes-one man and one woman.
Many persons who might otherwise favor equal contractual rights
for same-sex domestic partners nevertheless object to the concept
of same-sex "marriage. The debate surrounding same-sex mar-
riage is also emotionally charged because marriage in our culture
is, for many, inextricably tied to religion. 10 Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that marriage, wholly apart from its religious aspects, is
also a civil institution, carrying with it a plethora of rights and du-
ties emanating from state and nation. That said, the subject of this
article is limited to "civil marriage" because it is "civil marriage"
which is at stake in Hawaii and which is the subject of both the fed-
eral and state Defense of Marriage Acts, not the substantial equiva-
lent of marriage or marriage in the religious sense.
The purpose of this article is to examine the constitutionality,
or unconstitutionality as the case may be, of Minnesota's version of
the Defense of Marriage Act. Although the topic would seem to be
a fairly narrow one, it necessarily entails a general discussion of the
United States Supreme Court's treatment of marriage throughout
the years, the Hawaii courts' decisions in Baehr, the questionable
constitutionality of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act,11 Minne-
sota's choice of law rules as traditionally applied to marriage and
divorce, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.
Nelson.l" The constitutionality of Minnesota's Defense of Marriage
Dec. 3, 1996).
6. By September 1, 1997, approximately 40 states had amended their laws,
in one way or another, to prohibit same-sex marriage.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (Supp. 1998).
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1421 (1993).
9. See ANDREW SULLIVAN, SAME SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 190-92 (1997)
(citing William Safire, Same-Sex Marriage Nears, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1996, at A27).
10. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1497-1502 (discussing the history of mar-
riage under aJudeo-Christian social construction).
11. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (Supp. 1997) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (Supp. 1997).
12. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
1998]
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legislation will be examined under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution, in relation to the fundamental
right of interstate travel as guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution, and under the Equal Protection clauses of the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions, particularly in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans.
3
The article concludes that the federal Defense of Marriage Act
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. In addition, the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act vio-
lates the fundamental right to travel guaranteed by the federal con-
stitution and, most likely, the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States and Minnesota constitutions. If the Minnesota De-
fense of Marriage legislation is interpreted to prohibit the recogni-
tion of same-sex divorce decrees entered in other states, it also vio-
lates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Finally, if the Minnesota
Defense of Marriage legislation is struck down as unconstitutional,
Minnesota's choice of law rules pertaining to marriage will require
the state to recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into else-
where if the spouses resided in a state permitting same-sex mar-
riage at the time of their marriage.
II. MARRIAGE: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT FOR SOME BUT NOT FOR
OTHERS
A. The United States Supreme Court On Marriage
Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court de-. ,,14
scribed marriage as "the most important relation in life, and the
"foundation of the family and of society, without which there would. .. . . ,15
be neither civilization nor progress.' Personal decisions with re-
spect to marriage are ones which an individual may make without
unjustified governmental interference. 6 Indeed, the freedom to
marry whom one chooses has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness. 7
13. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
14. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
15. Id. at 211.
16. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citing
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967)); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaF-
leur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (stating that the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family).
17. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
[Vol. 24
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In Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court held that the
right to marry was a part of the fundamental "right of privacy" im-
plicit in the Fourteenth Amendment,19 and stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the de-
gree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social proj-
ects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.20
Despite the Supreme Court's unqualified proclamations, mar-
riage has historically been a fundamental right for some citizens,
but not others.2 ' Generally, marriage is only a fundamental right if
you seek to marry a single adult, of the opposite sex, to whom you2
are not closely related. Less than fifty years ago, thirty of the
forty-eight states banned interracial marriages by statute, and it
was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia,24
held that anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Thus, it
was not until relatively recently that there was determined to be a
26fundamental right to marry regardless of race.
The anti-miscegenation statutes provide an apt analogy to the
proliferation of legislation designed to prohibit persons of the
same sex from marrying.2 7 Indeed, the justifications put forth by
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. See id. at 486; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
21. This is true despite the fact that "[i]n determining which rights are fun-
damental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and
private notions." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Rather,
courts must consider the traditions of our society and determine whether a prin-
ciple is so ingrained in the collective conscience to deem it a fundamental right.
See id. The question is whether the right "is of such a character that it cannot be
denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'.. ." Id. (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
22. See, e.g., MrNN. STAT. §§ 517.02 & 517.03, subd. 1 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
23. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 62 n.24 (Haw. 1993).
24. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. See id. at 2.
26. It does not appear that Minnesota ever prohibited interracial marriage.
27. Surprisingly, America may be more ready to accept same-sex marriage
today than it was ready in 1968 to accept interracial marriage. In 1968, the year
1998]
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the trial judge who found the Lovings to have violated Virginia's
ban on interracial marriage, harkens the arguments often made by
those opposed to same-sex marriage: that homosexual relation-
ships are unnatural, immoral and contrary to religious teachings.
The trial judge in Loving, discussing the basis for Virginia's ban on
interracial marriage, stated in his order,
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, ma-
lay and red, and he placed them on separate continents.
And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
races to mix.
28
Equally shocking by today's standards was the Virginia Su-
preme Court's rationale for upholding the constitutionality of the
anti-miscegenation statute. The court found legitimate the state's
purposes of preserving the racial integrity of its citizens, preventing
the corruption of blood, and the obliteration of racial pride, and
29endorsing the doctrine of white supremacy.
B. Baker v. Nelson: The Minnesota Supreme Court On Same-Sex
Marriage
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the anti-
miscegenation analogy and held that there is no fundamental right
to same-sex marriage. In Baker v. Nelson,3° the court concluded that
Minnesota's marriage laws, codified in chapter 517 of the Minne-
sota Statutes, do not authorize marriage between persons of the
same sex and, consequently, that such marriages are prohibited.3'
The result the court reached is hardly earth-shattering, considering
the state of civil rights for homosexuals and the public's limited
understanding and acceptance of sexual orientation issues. While
challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage may have seemed
ripe coming just four years on the heels of Loving, Bakerwas clearly
a case before its time.
Loving was decided, a Gallop poll found that some 72 percent of Americans still
disapproved of interracial marriages even if they were prepared to accept it. See
SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at XXI. By comparison, a Newsweek poll conducted in
1996, found that 58 percent of Americans oppose legalizing same-sex marriage.
See id. at XXII.
28. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
29. Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955)).
30. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
31. See id.at 312, 191 N.W.2dat 186.
[Vol. 24
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In Baker, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex mar-
riage indicated a legislative intent to authorize such marriages.3
2
The statute at issue provided in relevant part:
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil
contract, to which the consent of the parties, capable in
law of contracting, is essential. Lawful marriage hereafter
may be contracted only when a license has been obtained
therefor as provided by law and when such marriage is
contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solem-
nized by one authorized, or whom the parties in good
faith believe to be authorized, so to do.
The court relied on the common usage of the word "marriage"
and the marriage laws themselves, which were "replete with words
of heterosexual import such as 'husband and wife' and 'bride and
groom.' 3 The court's comment that it would be unrealistic to
think that the original draftsmen of the marriage statutes would
have used these terms in any different sense is undeniably true.
35
The Baker court then rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the statute, so interpreted, violated the First, Eighth, Ninth or
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 6 The
court's analysis here is unconvincing and cryptic.3 7 Although the
court, relying on Loving, obviously believed marriage to be one of
the "'basic civil rights of man,"' it nevertheless held that marriage
was not a fundamental right for men.as The court soundly rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that confining marriage to heterosexuals
was irrational and invidiously discriminatory, but failed to analyze
whether there was a rational basis for prohibiting same-sex mar-
39riage.
Rather than justifying the prohibition, as constitutional analy-
sis requires, the court simply reiterated the obvious-that marriage
32. See id. at 311-12, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86.
33. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1971).
34. Baker, 291 Minn. at 311-12, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86.
35. See id. at 311, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
36. See id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
37. See id. at 312-15, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87. The court dismissed without dis-
cussion the plaintiffs' contentions that the marriage statute violated the First and
Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See id. at 312 n.2, 191
N.W.2d at 186 n.2.
38. Id. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967)) (emphasis added).
39. See id. at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
1998]
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has been traditionally a heterosexual institution:
The institution of marriage as a union of a man and
woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children within a family is as old as the book of Genesis.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very ex-
istence and survival of the race. This historic institution
manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted con-
temporary concept of marriage and societal interests for
which petitioners contend. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring
it by judicial legislation. 4°
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' reliance on Griswold by
characterizing the Supreme Court's holding in Griswold as nothing
more than a basic prohibition on a state's ability to intrude upon
the right of privacy inherent in the marital relationship-the state
having authorized the marriage in the first place.4' The court
found that Griswold does not apply where the state has prohibited
the marriage itself, and again culled language from the opinion
harkening back to our traditional notions of marriage.
42
The court's scarcely adequate equal protection analysis is even
more frustrating:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the
state's classification of persons authorized to marry.
There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. Peti-
tioners note that the state does not impose upon hetero-
sexual married couples a condition that they have a
proved capacity or declared willingness to procreate, pos-
ing a rhetorical demand that this court must read such
condition into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be
prohibited. Even assuming that such a condition would
be neither unrealistic nor offensive under the Griswold ra-
tionale, the classification is no more than theoretically
imperfect. We are reminded, however, that "abstract
symmetry" is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
40. Id. at 312-13, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
41. See id. at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
42. See id. at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (discussing "the traditional relation of
the family-a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization"
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)).
43. Id. at 313-14, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 24
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Dismissing plaintiffs' analogy to the anti-miscegenation laws
struck down in Loving, the court simply concluded that "in com-
monsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction
between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one
based upon the fundamental difference in sex."4 What this "clear
distinction" is, however, is anything but clear, particularly in light
of the court's steadfast refusal to address head-on the plaintiffs' ar-
guments regarding procreation. 45
Although marriage in the United States has historically been
46defined as a relationship between persons of different sexes, in
the past it had also been reserved solely for persons of the same
race. In fact, interracial marriage was lawfully prohibited in a ma-
jority of the states until just 30 years ago.41 "Just as interracial mar-
riage was portrayed in such a way as to isolate African Americans
from mainstream society, so prohibitions against same-sex marriage
help to preserve the subordination of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
within society. "48
At least the Loving Court, in upholding Virginia's anti-
miscegenation law, engaged in a constitutional analysis by setting
forth the state's "legitimate" purposes for justifying its prohibition
on interracial marriages (as misguided as those "legitimate" pur-
poses were). 49 The fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court dis-
posed of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges in two vague pages
ably demonstrates that, despite human rights advances that fol-
lowed the Stonewall riots,5° neither society nor the courts were
44. Id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
45. See id. at 313-14, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
46. Actually, same-sex marriage is far from unprecedented. See Eskridge, su-
pra note 8, at 1435-84 (providing an exhaustive discussion of same-sex marriage
throughout history and in other cultures); see also SuLLIvAN, supra note 9, at 3-45.
47. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
48. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1423.
49. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
50. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1420 n.5. The Stonewall Riots of June 27
and 28, 1969, in which gay and lesbian patrons of the Stonewall Bar in New York
City fought back against a routine police raid, are widely considered to be the sin-
gle most significant defining moment in the battle for human rights of gays and
lesbians in the United States. See id. Stonewall:
did for gay and lesbian liberation what the lunch counter sit-ins did for
the African-American civil rights movement: the riots provided martyrs,
demonstrated open resistance to oppressive social practices, and created
a focal point for future struggle. Although the gay and lesbian rights
movement in the United States started as early as the 1950s, it made
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ready 5to seriously accept as radical a concept as same-sex mar-
riage. Thus, while the gay community might applaud the Baker
plaintiffs for fighting for the basic, fundamental right of gay mar-
riage, the community is left with controlling case law, which places
another obstacle in the way of legally recognized same-sex mar-
riages.5' Had the plaintiffs waited a few years to bring suit, how-
ever, the result would likely have been the same; every state and
federal court which considered same-sex marriage after 1971
reached the same result.13 That is, until Hawaii.
III. UNDERSTANDING BAEHR IT'S NOT A GAY THING
The same-sex applicants in Baehr filed their complaint for in-
junctive and declaratory relief on May 1, 1991, seeking a judicial
declaration that the construction and application of Hawaii Revised
Statutes Section 572-154 to deny an application for a license to
marry because an applicant couple of the same sex was unconstitu-
tional.55 On October 1, 1991, the trial court granted the state's mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the lawsuit.56
The applicants appealed the judgment to the Hawaii Supreme
Court, challenging both the constitutionality of the statute and the
51. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312-15, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87
(1971).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, No. Civ. A. 90-13892, 1992 WL
685364, at *2-3 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), afjd per curiam, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995) (holding that the legislature's refusal to authorize same-sex marriages does
not violate either due process or the Equal Protection clause); Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that right to same-sex marriages
is not protected by the Constitution); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195-97
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding state's prohibition against same-sex marriages
does not violate the Equal Protection clause). See also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F.
Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (ruling that same-sex marriage between Ameri-
can and Australian was invalid for immigration purposes); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54
F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (dismissing action to compel issuance of mar-
riage license to same-sex couple who failed to properly submit a brief); De Santo
v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that common law
same-sex marriage does not exist in Pennsylvania).
54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1984) did not specifically provide that persons
of the same sex could not marry. It did, however, repeatedly refer to the parties
of the marriage as being a "man" and a "woman," and also referred to the married
persons as being "husband" and "wife." See id.
55. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
56. See id. at *2.
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trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit on the pleadings." The su-
preme court ruled in favor of the applicants on both accounts, and
remanded the case for a trial to determine whether Hawaii's pro-
hibition of same-sex marriage could survive strict scrutiny, i.e.,
whether the prohibition was justified by compelling state interests
and narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitu-
58tional rights.
The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr was widely con-
sidered to be a civil rights victory for gays and lesbians and, at least
in its application and practical effect, it was such a significant mile-
stone. What many people find surprising, however, is that the
Baehr result had nothing to do with sexual orientation per se. In-
deed, like all of the courts before it, the Hawaii Supreme Court re-
fused to find a fundamental right to same-sex marriage in Hawaii's
constitution, even though Hawaii's constitution guarantees a right
of privacy.61 This right of privacy includes, at a minimum, all of the
fundamental rights expressly recognized as being subsumed in the
United States Constitution, including the fundamental right to
marry first recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma 6' and more recently
affirmed in Zablocki v. Redhail.'3
57. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52-68 (Haw. 1993).
58. See id. at 68.
59. Evan Wolfson, one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in Baehr,
summed up the import and contradictions in Baehr as follows:
The Baehr decision, then, although imperfect, is remarkable. Inclusion
at the level of marriage is uniquely revolutionary, conservatively subver-
sive, singularly faithful to true American and family values in a way that
few, if any, other gay and lesbian victories would be. This is true not only
because of marriage's central symbolic importance in our society and
culture, but also because of what the court called the "encyclopedic"
multiplicity of rights and benefits that are contingent upon that status.
Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Mariage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men
and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567, 580 (1994-
95). It is for these same reasons that others are so adamantly opposed to same-sex
marriage.
60. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *19.
61. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating "[t]he right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.").
62. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In Skinner, the right to marry appears to have
been inextricably linked to procreation. At issue was a statute which allowed
Oklahoma to sterilize habitual criminals against their will. Id. at 537. In striking
down the law, the Skinner Court stated that the legislation involved "one of the ba-
sic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
63. 434 U.S. 374, 374 (1978). In Zablocki, the Supreme Court considered a
1998]
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Specifically, the Hawaii Supreme Court refused the applicants'
invitation to recognize a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.
6
4
Applying the criteria set forth by Justice Goldberg in his concur-
ring opinion in Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the right to
same-sex marriage is not so rooted in the "traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people" that the failure to recognize
it would violate the "fundamental principles of liberty and Justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. J5 Nor
did the Court "believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor jus-
tice would exist if it were sacrificed." 66 Given these conclusions
alone, Baehr could hardly be trumpeted as a civil rights victory for
gays and lesbians.
The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, also considered whether
Hawaii's marriage laws were unconstitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause of its constitution, which provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor be denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the ex-
ercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.
Because sex is a suspect category under Hawaii's equal protec-
tion clause, and section 572-1 of the Hawaii Statutes regulates mari-
tal status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of
sex, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that strict scrutiny ap-
plied."8 Consequently, the court held that the marriage statute was
presumptively unconstitutional and remanded the case to the trial
court to determine whether the state could "show that the statute's
sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests"
and "narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the ap-
plicant couples' constitutional rights."69
Wisconsin statute prohibiting a Wisconsin resident with minor, noncustodial chil-
dren from marrying until the resident demonstrated to a court that he was in
compliance with his child support obligations, if any. Id. at 375. The Zablocki
Court, applying strict scrutiny, struck down the statute, concluding that it bur-
dened the fundamental right to marriage. Id. at 390-91.
64. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
65. Id. at 57 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring)).
66. Id.
67. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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In the majority's view, 70 homosexuality, and whether it consti-
tuted an immutable trait, were immaterial to its equal protection
analysis, the touchstone being sex, not sexual orientation. 71 Ex-
plaining itself, the court noted that Hawaii's marriage laws do not
prohibit homosexuals from marrying because they may in fact
marry persons of the opposite sex and, conversely, homosexuals
72and heterosexuals alike may not marry someone of the same sex.
In sum, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Hawaii's marriage
laws were presumptively unconstitutional because they classified
persons on the basis of sex. The state may not deny a man or a
woman a marriage license based solely upon the sex of the person
who they seek to marry unless of course there is a compelling rea-
son for doing so.
On remand, the state argued that the following interests were
compelling and therefore justified its denial of same-sex marriage:
(1) protecting the health and welfare of children and other per-
sons, (2) fostering procreation within a marital setting, (3) secur-
ing or assuring recognition of Hawaii's marriages in other jurisdic-
tions, (4) protecting the state's public fisc from the reasonably
foreseeable effects of state approval of same-sex marriage, and (5)
protecting civil liberties, including the reasonably foreseeable ef-
fects of state approval of same-sex marriages, on its citizens.74 The
trial primarily focused on the state's claim that it had a compelling
interest to promote optimal development of children and its posi-
tion that it is best for a child to be raised in a single home by its
parents, or at least by a married male and female.75 In this regard,
70. One justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court filed a separate concurrence,
agreeing that the case should be remanded, but for a determination of whether
sexual orientation was biologically fated so that "sex" as used in Hawaii's Equal
Protection Clause included differences in sexual orientation. See id. at 68-70
(Burns, J., concurring in the result).
71. Id.at53n.14.
72. Id. at51 n.ll.
73. See id. at 68. One justice dissented, concluding that section 572-1 does
not establish a suspect classification based on gender because it treats all males
and females alike, and a rational basis exists for prohibiting same-sex marriage
since marriage exists primarily for the propagation of the human race. Id. at 71-
74 (Heen,J., dissenting).
74. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1, 3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996).
75. Id. at *20. The trial court dismissed, with minimal discussion, the state's
claims that same-sex marriage would create an adverse impact on the public fisc.
Id. It also dismissed the state's claim that there would be an adverse impact to
Hawaii based upon other jurisdictions' refusals to recognize Hawaii same-sex mar-
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the state and the applicants each presented testimony from four
76
expert witnesses. The battle of the experts was not even close, as
the state's experts routinely conceded major points on cross-
examination thereby undermining the state's case at every turn.
77
Although the trial court found that an intact family environ-
ment consisting of a child and his or her mother and father pres-
ents a less-burdened environment for the development of a happy,
healthy and well-adjusted child, it concluded that the single most
important factor in the development of a happy, healthy and well-
adjusted child is the nurturing relationship between parent and
child, which is not dependent upon sexual orientation. The court
recognized the wide diversity in the structure and configuration of
families, specifically found that gay and lesbian parents can be and
are as fit and loving as heterosexual parents, and that gay and les-
bian parents and same-sex couples can and do provide children
with a nurturing relationship and an environment in which they
can thrive. 79 Not only did the court find that the state failed to es-
tablish a causal link between allowing same-sex marriage and ad-
verse effects upon the optimal development of children, it found
that "children being raised by... same-sex couples may be assisted
by the recognition of same-sex marriage because they may [then]
obtain certain protections and benefits that come with or become
available as a result of marriage.
8 0
Finally, the court, addressing the institution of marriage itself,
concluded that in Hawaii and elsewhere, people marry for a variety
of reasons, including "(1) having and raising children, (2) stability
and commitment, (3) emotional closeness, (4) intimacy and mo-
nogamy, (5) the establishment of a framework for a long-term rela-
tionship, (6) personal significance, (7) recognition by society, and
(8) certain legal and economic protections, benefits and obliga-
tions;" reasons which the trial court found were shared in Hawaii
and elsewhere by gay men and lesbians who want to marry."' The
riages, citing the federal constitution's full faith and credit clause. Id. Finally, the
trial court summarily dismissed the state's claim that it needed to protect tradi-
tional marriage as a fundamental structure in society, stating that the evidentiary
record in the case was inadequate to examine and decide this issues. Id.
76. Id. at *4-16.
77. Id. at *4-9.
78. Id. at *16.
79. Id.
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court specifically rejected the state's argument that legalized prosti-
tution, incest and polygamy will occur if same-sex marriage is al-
lowed, noting that there are compelling reasons and established
precedent to prevent and prohibit these activities.8
2
Having rejected the state's arguments, the trial court enjoined
the state from denying an application for marriage solely because
the applicants are of the same sex. 8' The judgment, however, was
stayed pending review by the supreme court. As of the date of this
article, the Hawaii Supreme Court has not yet issued a decision. It
did not hear oral arguments in the case, and a decision could come
down at any time. Based upon its earlier decision, the weakness of
the state's case, and the deference paid to a trial court's findings of
fact, the court will likely affirm the trial court's findings, thereby
84entitling same-sex couples in Hawaii to legally marry. It is widely
believed that same-sex couples from across the nation will flock to
Hawaii to get married and then return to their home states and
demand recognition for their marriages. Be assured that litigation
will ensue as the federal government, the states, employers and
82. Id. at*20-21.
83. Id. at *22.
84. See LESBIAN AND GAY LAW ASS'N. OF GREATER N.Y., Who Will be the First with
Same-Sex Marriage: Hawaii or the Netherlands? LESBIAN/GAY LAw NoTEs, Nov. 1997,
at 163.
Also pending in Hawaii, however, is a ballot measure approved by the
state legislature, scheduled for a vote in November of 1998, when the
state's voters will be asked whether the state constitution should be
amended to authorize the legislature to determine whether marriage
should be restricted to opposite-sex couples.
Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will decide in 1998 whether a
referendum on holding a state constitutional convention must be rerun. In 1996,
a plurality voted in favor of holding a constitutional convention, but the Hawaii
Supreme Court ruled that an absolute majority of all voters was necessary to
authorize the convention. Id. Opponents of same-sex marriage had hoped to use
the convention to accomplish the objective of the scheduled 1998 ballot measure.
Id. Thus, although Hawaii may be the first state to recognize same-sex marriage,
the permanence of that recognition is questionable. Id.
Even if the Hawaii Supreme Court reverses the trial court's decision in
Baehr, or its legislature or general population eventually prohibits same-sex mar-
riage through a constitutional amendment, the debate over same-sex marriage
and DOMA will likely continue, both in the United States and in foreign jurisdic-
tions. A challenge to Vermont's marriage laws, for example, appears poised for
success. See id. Vermont has an equal protection clause similar to Hawaii's, a gay
rights law, and domestic partnership benefits provided by the state. Even more
significantly, DOMA legislation has twice failed in Vermont's legislature. See id.
Finally, the Netherlands is on the verge of becoming the first modem jurisdiction
to extend the full right to marry to same-sex couples. See id.
1998]
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others refuse to recognize these marriages.
IV. THE FEDERAL REACTION
A. The Defense Of Marriage Act
As a result of the Baehr decision, Congress easily passed the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was signed into law by
815
President Clinton on September 21, 1996. DOMA presumably re-
sulted from a fear that a significant number of same-sex couples
would travel to Hawaii, get married, and return home expecting
their home state to recognize their marriage under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution." Others saw
DOMA as nothing more than a political ploy-an attempt by Re-
publicans to force liberal Democrats to take an unpopular position
in an election year, jeopardizing their chances of reelection-and
argued that DOMA was superfluous because full faith and credit
would not require the states to recognize same-sex marriage if such
marriages were contrary to the states' public policy. 7
There are two separate aspects to DOMA. The first purpose is
to confer a right on the states, irrespective of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, to legally ignore same-sex mar-
riages performed lawfully under another state's laws. The Act
states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, ter-
ritory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship be-
tween persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession,
85. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (Supp. 1997) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (Supp. 1997). The
House approved DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67, and the Senate passed DOMA by a
vote of 85 to 14. See Diane M. Guillerman, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act:
The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34
HOUSTON L. REv. 425, 443 (1997).
86. Id. at 442. This fear is probably not unfounded. In a 1994 survey of gay
men by THE ADVOCATE, a national gay and lesbian news magazine, nearly two-
thirds of the respondents stated that they would marry if they were legally able to,
and only 15% stated that they would not marry. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at
583.
87. See, e.g., Representative Barney Frank's comments during the Hearings of
the House Judiciary Committee on DOMA, May 15, 1996, quoted in SULLIVAN, su-
pra note 9, at 213-17.
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or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such a relation-
ship.88
The second aspect of DOMA, which will not be treated here, is
to define the term "marriage" for purposes of federal laws.89
"Marriage" is defined as "only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife," and the word "spouse" is defined
as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 90
B. DOMA Violates Full Faith And Credit
It is ironic that Congress passed DOMA so that the states
would not have to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages
performed in Hawaii. In doing so, Congress itself passed a law
which is most likely an unconstitutional restriction on full faith and
credit. What makes this truly ironic, however, is that full faith and
credit would not likely have forced states to recognize same-sex
marriages performed outside their borders because the Constitu-
tion's Full Faith and Credit Clause contains a judicially recognized
public policy exception.9' Instead, whether states will be required
to recognize same-sex marriages depends upon each state's choice
of law rules.
The Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
92
Whether DOMA is found to be unconstitutional under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause will likely depend upon the interpreta-
88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (Supp. 1997).
89. For a discussion of the constitutionality, or more appropriately, the un-
constitutionality of this second aspect of DOMA, see Mark Strasser, Loving the
Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 279, 313 (1997) (arguing that Section 3 of DOMA is an unconstitutional in-
trusion into an area traditionally and properly reserved for the states); Scott
Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional
Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1467 (1997) (same); but see Leonard G. Brown
III, Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans
and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 159, 172-73 (1996)
(arguing that Congress may use federal law to regulate federal benefits).
90. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (Supp. 1997).
91. See infra Part VI.A.
92. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
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tion given the second sentence of the clause.9 Congress has en-
acted three pieces of legislation pursuant to this provision: The Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) Of 1980, 9 the Full Faith
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994 , and the Safe
96
Homes for Women Act of 1994. Significantly, all three of these
laws further the application of full faith and credit and are consis-
tent with the principle of federalism. 97 Congress has never passed
legislation like DOMA, which limits or nullifies the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.98
DOMA is antithetical to the Full Faith and Credit Clause be-
cause it restricts rather than fosters federalism.9 The Supreme
Court has stated:
The very purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
to alter the status of the several states as independent for-
eign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created
93. There is some conflict as to whether marriage falls into any of the catego-
ries included within the Full Faith and Credit Clause, i.e., public acts, records or
judicial proceedings. This is not a particularly compelling issue. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has never ruled on whether a state must provide full faith and credit
to marriages from another state, see Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 89, at 1439, marriage,
it seems, is the epitome of a public act, at least in Minnesota, where a state license
is necessary and common law marriage is disallowed. See Gerber v. Gerber, 241
Minn. 346, 347-48, 64 N.W.2d 779, 781 (1954) (stating marriage is a contract be-
tween three parties: the husband, the wife and the state); see also Thomas M.
Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REv. 499, 506 (1995) (stating marriage might also
qualify as ajudicial proceeding if performed by a judge). See id. Finally, although
a divorce decree, an all too common consequence of marriage, is a judgment,
DOMA purportedly would allow a state to refuse to give effect to it.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
95. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (Supp. 1997).
96. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (Supp. 1997).
97. But see Brown, supra note 89, at 166 (arguing that the PKPA negatively
affects full faith and credit because it limits states to three jurisdictional bases
upon which they may afford full faith and credit to custody decrees of another
state). It is unclear how the federal DOMA will be interpreted in light of the Pa-
rental Kidnapping and Parentage Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act. See Strasser, supra note 89, at 321-22. There is a conflict be-
tween the last-in-time rule and the presumption that the courts should not pre-
sume that Congress enacted a law which allows avoidance of the moral and legal
obligations of child and spousal maintenance.
98. See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 89, at 1460.
99. Professor Lawrence Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law
School, believes that DOMA, as an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
is "plainly unconstitutional." 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996)
(statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, as read into the Record by Senator Ted Ken-
nedy) quoted in Brown, supra note 89, at 165. Professor Tribe specifically takes is-
sue with DOMA's "negative" rather than "unifying" effect on federalism. Id.
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under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the oth-
ers, and to make them integral parts of a single nation
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might
be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its
• • 100
origin.
Yet DOMA expressly gives each state the right to disregard the pub-
lic acts, records and judicial proceedings of another state; allowing
each state to act as an independent sovereignty when it comes to
marriage and divorce.
Proponents of DOMA argue that DOMA is not an intrusion by
the federal government into an area reserved for the states, but is
necessary to protect the autonomy of the states so that they are not
forced to recognize another state's acts which are contrary to their
own public policies.01 This argument misses the point because the
Full Faith and Credit Clause already has a public policy exception.
DOMA was unnecessary legislation that did nothing more than dis-
courage federalism.0 2 DOMA is unconstitutional because Congress
does not have the power to restrict, abrogate or dilute full faith and
credit.
V. THE STATE REACTION
In response to the developments in Hawaii, the Minnesota leg-
islature amended Minnesota Statutes section 517.01 to read in
relevant part:
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil
contract between a man and a woman, to which the con-
sent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is essen-
tial. Lawful marriage may be contracted only between per-
sons of the opposite sex and only when a license has been
obtained as provided by law and when the marriage is
contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solem-
nized by one authorized, or whom one or both of the par-
ties in good faith believe to be authorized, so to do.103
Additionally, Minnesota Statutes section 517.03, subd. 1 (a) (4)
was amended to specifically prohibit "a marriage between persons
100. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
101. SeeBrown, supra note 89, at 168-69.
102. See Strasser, supra note 89, at 300-01.
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se.104of the same sex. Finally, the legislature provided that: "A mar-
riage entered into by persons of the same sex, either under com-
mon law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign
jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by
virtue of the marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this
state."'15
The history of this legislation bears mentioning because it
demonstrates that the legislature was not motivated by any clear
understanding of relevant law, but by other reasons, be they politi-
cal, hateful, rooted in fear or simply uninformed. 10 6 From January
until March of 1997, the proposed amendments sponsored by
Senator Tom Neuville, R-Northfield, 10 7 prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage did not get out of committees controlled by key democrats.
08
Republicans countered by inserting the DOMA amendments into
any available bill. 9 In March, 35 senators wrote a letter requesting
that the bill be given a hearing, and Senator Neuville moved, un-
successfully, for a hearing pursuant to Senate Rule 40.2 In sup-
104. MINN. STAT. § 517.03 subd. 1(b) (Supp. 1998). Prior to this change, the
statute prohibited marriages between persons already married and certain family
members and relatives.
105. Id.
106. Representative Arlon Lindner, R-Corcoran, perhaps the most publicly
vocal proponent of the state DOMA, read a letter on the floor of the Minnesota
House of Representatives regarding the "homosexual agenda" to destroy the fam-
ily as well as the gay rights platform which includes, among other things, a repeal
of the laws regulating the age of sexual consent and the number of persons con-
stituting a marriage. Audiotape of Minnesota House of Representatives, Tape 4,
80th Session, 61st day (May 16, 1997) (available at Minnesota Legislative Law Li-
brary). He also stated that sanctioning same-sex marriages would open the door
to "a man marrying a child or a man marrying a dog." See Patricia Lopez Baden,
Face to Face on Gay Marriage, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 15, 1997, at lB. Re-
counting an incident of molestation when he was a child, Lindner stated in a Star
Tribune interview regarding same-sex marriage, that as a child he "wasn't savvy to
the ways of homosexuals at the time." Id.
107. Senator Neuville denied that the purpose for introducing the bill was
hateful or malicious; the purpose was to protect the status quo from a legislatively
active court. In defending the bill, however, Senator Neuville relied on argu-
ments regarding procreation in marriage, and implied that homosexuals are infe-
rior to heterosexuals when it comes to nurturing children. Partial Audiotape of
Senate Floor S. F. 1908, Tape 2, Side B, 80th Session (May 16, 1997).
108. See Patricia Lopez Baden, Gay Marriage Ban Passes Easily Despite Spear's
Plea, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 17, 1997, at lB [hereinafter Gay Marriage Ban
Passes]; Patricia Lopez Baden, Gay Marriage Ban Meets Roadblock: State's Version of
Defense of Marriage Act Unlikely to Get Hearing this Session, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
March 12, 1997, at lB [hereinafter Gay Marriage Ban Meets Roadblock].
109. See Gay Marriage Ban Passes, supra note 108, at lB.
110. See Patricia Lopez Baden, Bid to Ban Same-Sex Marriage Advances: Measure
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port of the motion and the amendments, proponents argued that
although the bill would not change Minnesota's substantive law,
time was of the essence because Hawaii was poised to allow same-
sex marriage. According to the bill's proponents, if Minnesota
failed to pass the amendments, Minnesota would be required to
give full faith and credit to Hawaii same-sex marriages or would be
in the precarious position of having to apply the law retroactively."'
Later that same month, the legislative amendments were suc-
cessfully tacked on to a five billion dollar omnibus Health and
Human Services bill." 2 This was a crucial piece of legislation which
the state was required to pass if it wanted to retain a significant
amount of federal funding.13 By including the DOMA amend-
ments on this piece of legislation, DOMA proponents were guaran-
teed that the amendments would be considered. Moreover, the
legislature would easily pass DOMA because legislators who might
not otherwise vote in favor of DOMA would be hard-pressed to vote
against a necessary piece of legislation." 4 This strategy also allowed
an easy out for legislators who might otherwise have had to face
angry gay and heterosexual constituents who supported same-sex
marriage.
Despite the obvious impact the DOMA legislation would have
on same-sex couples wishing to marry and an impassioned plea by
Senate President Allen Spear, no public hearings were held on the
topic."5 On May 16, 1997, the legislation easily passed 54-12 in the
Senate and 112 to 19 in the House, with little debate"" or fanfare.1
7
Added to Child Support Bill in House, STARDUTIB. (Minneapolis), March 20, 1997, at
lB [hereinafter Bid to Ban Same-Sex Marriage Advances].
111. See Bid to Ban Same-Sex Marriage Advances, supra note 110, at 1B
(comments of Rep. Charlie Weaver, R-Anoka); Gay Marriage Ban Meets Roadblock,
supra note 108, at 1B (comments of Rep. Neuville and Rep. Steve Sviggum, R-
Kenyon).
112. See Gay Marriage Ban Passes, supra note 108, at 1B.
113. The sponsor of the HHS bill, Matt Entenza, DFL-St. Paul, who voted
against the amendment, had little choice but to accept it because withdrawing the
bill would have likely resulted in the loss of federal money. Bid to Ban Same-Sex
Marriage Advances, supra note 110, at lB.
114. See Gay Marriage Ban Passes, supra note 108, at lB. The legislation pro-
vided, among other things, a 31 million dollar increase in children's funding in-
cluding money for crisis nurseries, mental health collaboratives and child abuse
prevention, and a 36 million dollar cost-of-living adjustment for personal care at-
tendants and others providing care for the disabled and elderly.
115. See Gay Marriage Ban Meets Roadblock, supra note 108, at 1B. This is the
same legislature that spent days in hearings on possible alternatives to adding a
new area code in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
116. Senator Samuelson acknowledged on the Senate Floor, after Senator
1998]
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VI. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, CHOICE OF LAW, AND THE MINNESOTA
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
It is ironic that Minnesota passed special legislation so that it
could, notwithstanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, avoid recognizing same-sex marriages
performed in Hawaii because full faith and credit probably would
not have required such recognition given its public policy excep-
tion. Rather, whether Minnesota is required to recognize same-sex
marriages performed elsewhere depends on its choice of law rules
governing marriage. However, the provision of the state DOMA
which allows Minnesota to ignore same-sex divorce clearly violates
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Divorce, unlike marriage, is re-
duced to a judgment. Significantly, no public policy exception en-
ables a state to ignore a valid judgment obtained in another state.
A. Full Faith and Credit and Marriage
In considering the constitutionality of Minnesota's DOMA, it
makes sense to begin with a discussion of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution because concerns regard-
ing full faith and credit were the impetus for DOMA. In the end,
however, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not provide a seri-
ous constitutional challenge to DOMA because of its public policy
exception. DOMA is much more likely to be struck down based
upon its significant negative effect on the fundamental right to
travel and because it is repugnant class legislation which violates
equal protection.
The constitutional requirement of full faith and credit does
not automatically compel a forum state to "substitute the statutes of
other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter con-
cerning which it is competent to legislate.""' Full faith and credit
Spear's comments, that the senate did not have an opportunity to debate the issue
as it should have, and stated that there may have been a different attitude about it
if it had been fully debated. May 16, 1997, Senate Floor S. F. 1908, Tape 2, Side
A. The debate that did occur, however, was described as "some of the most acri-
monious and personal debate of the legislative session." Gay Marriage Ban Passes,
supra note 108, at lB.
117. See Gay Marriage Ban Passes, supra note 108, at lB. Governor Carlson
signed the health care bill despite being critical of attaching controversial social
policy amendments to spending bills and having previously vetoed health care
bills containing abortion-related amendments. See Patricia Lopez Boden, Ban on
Gay Marriages Likely To Become Law, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 15, 1997, at IA.
118. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
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does not require a state to give effect to another state's statuto 7
policies when to do so would be counter to domestic policy.
Marriage is not only a subject matter which the states have tradi-
tionally legislated, it is a subject matter that has traditionally been
within the exclusive province of the states. In other words, each
state has the exclusive right and power to determine its resident
and domiciled citizens' and subjects' status respecting marriage
and divorce.2 0
In Pennoyer v. Neff,1 the Supreme Court noted that a state "has
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes
for which it may be dissolved."'22 The State has an undeniable in-
terest in ensuring that its domestic relations rules reflect the widely
held values of its people.12' No federal precedent, however, clearly
resolves the ambiguities created by inconsistent state marriage laws,
such as the existence and recognition of common law marriages,
and full faith and credit has not been routinely applied in the do-
mestic relations area.
When considering whether full faith and credit requires a state
to give effect to another state's statutory policies or whether to do
so would be counter to the state's domestic policy, the Supreme
Court must choose between the two competing public policies in-
volved. 1 4 The basic conflict, however, is really between the princi-
ples embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the one• 125
hand, and the policy of the state on the other. Because the goal
of full faith and credit is the "maximum enforcement in each state
of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of
sister states, "126 in some instances, states must sacrifice their own
particular local policies as a part of the cost of membership in the
501 (1939).
119. See Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 284 N.W.2d 829, 833-34
(Minn. 1979).
120. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); see also Warner v. Warner, 219
Minn. 59, 67, 17 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1944).
121. 95 U.S. 714, 714 (1877).
122. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35.
123. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell,J., concurring).
124. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951); Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624-25 (1946).
125. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611.
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federal system. 127
It is likely that the Supreme Court would not require Minne-
sota (or the other 48 states which do not recognize same-sex mar-
riage) to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed
in Hawaii given the feverish opposition to same-sex marriage. The
result would likely be different if Minnesota were in a small minor-
ity of states that refused to permit or recognize same-sex marriage.
In such circumstances, one can more easily imagine the Supreme
Court holding that the unifying principles of federalism embedded
in the Full Faith and Credit Clause require Minnesota's public pol-
icy against same-sex marriage to give way. Although "[t]he Full
Faith and Credit Clause is not to be applied accordion-like to ac-
commodate our personal predilections, 128 here, it is one state's
personal predilections which are being forced on all of the other
states.
This is the strongest and most rational argument in support of
DOMA, and the reason why many persons who might otherwise
support human rights for gays and lesbians nevertheless support
DOMA. Why should Hawaii (perhaps more accurately, the Hawaii
Supreme Court) be allowed to force its particular local policies re-. -129
garding same-sex marriage on the rest of the union? The ques-
tion is especially significant because each state has traditionally had
the power to regulate its marriages, including the power to deter-
mine the requisites of a valid marriage contract and to control the
qualifications of the contracting parties?
3
1
Despite the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause will
probably not require states to recognize Hawaii same-sex marriages
by virtue of its public policy exception, it should. The Supreme
Court has stated that only in "exceptional circumstances" should a
state be allowed to refuse full faith and credit on the basis of its
own public policy. This is particularly true in the field of com-. 132
mercial law, where certainty is of high importance. The fields of
commercial law and contracts provide a fitting analogy to marriage,
127. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).
128. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1948).
129. See, e.g, Senator Phil Gramm's comments during the Senate Debate on
DOMA, October 9, 1996, quoted in SuLLIVAN, supra note 9, at 229-32.
130. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (1993).
131. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
132. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615 (1951); Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 592 (1947).
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which is, after all, a contract between two parties and the state.
The United States Supreme Court made this very analogy in the
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, where it lik-
ened the act of becoming a member of a corporation to the act of
marriage, and described it as "entering into a complex and abiding
relation.,
34
In commercial cases, the Supreme Court has often imposed a
"rather rigid rule that [the] state must defer to the law of the state
of incorporation, or to the law of the place of the contract."135 Full
faith and credit is more likely to be given under such circumstances
because there is a pre-existing relationship between the parties and
a need that the parties be able to predict the consequences of their
transaction at the time of its conception.1 36  As in commercial
transactions, spouses, be they of the same or opposite sex, should
be able to expect that their relationship will remain legally intact
unless and until one or both them decide to terminate it. 3 7 A
cross-country automobile journey should not cause a couple's mar-
riage to appear and disappear upon the crossing of state lines.
Moreover, Minnesota recognizes that each state has the exclu-
sive right and power to determine the status of its resident and
domiciled citizens and subjects respecting the question of marriage
and divorce."" Under the cooperative concept of federalism, a
state should be willing to accept and regulate marriages, including
same-sex marriages, licensed elsewhere in return for recognizing its
own, possibly idiosyncratic, marriages.!3 9 If states do not give full
faith and credit to marriages performed and legally recognized in
other states, no certainty exists for married couples as they cross
133. See Robertson v. Roth, 163 Minn. 501, 503, 204 N.W. 329, 329 (1925)
(stating that marriage is contractual in nature and carries with it certain responsi-
bilities and duties over which the parties have no control).
134. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 331 U.S. at 619-20 (quoting
Trapp v. Soverign Corp. of the Woodmen of the World, 102 Neb. 562, 168 N.W.
191 (1918)).
135. Hughes, 341 U.S. at 615; see also Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am.,
331 U.S. at 592.
136. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 617-18 (distinguishing tort cases from commercial
cases and stating that where the action does not rest on a pre-existing relationship,
there is no need to enable the parties to predict consequences of the transaction).
137. See Safranski v. Safranski, 222 Minn. 358, 362, 24 N.W.2d 834, 836 (1946)
(stating that marriage contract cannot be viewed as an ordinary contract because
the parties may not simply agree to terminate at any time, but must instead seek a
judgment of divorce).
138. Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 549, 252 N.W. 449, 450 (1934).
139. See Keane, supra note 93, at 507-08.
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state lines; they can be married in one state, but by the simple act
of travel, not married in another.' 4° This is an affront not only to
the spouses themselves, but to the state performing the marriage as
well. If full faith and credit is not given to same-sex marriages,
the rights and obligations of the parties become unpredictable and
almost inevitably unequal. 42
B. Full Faith and Credit and Divorce
A significant constitutional issue is raised by Minnesota's
DOMA legislation 43 to the extent that it means that the state will
not give full faith and credit to a divorce decree arising from an
otherwise valid same-sex marriage.' 44 Well-established law demands
that a dissolution be afforded full faith and credit because the dis-
solution has been reduced to a judgment. This is an anomaly in
light of the fact that the marriage itself might not have been enti-
fled to full faith and credit. However, Supreme Court precedent
"differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments. 145 Simply stated, there is "no rov-ing 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judg-
140. Travelers would be subject to, among other things, the possibility of li-
ability under state laws. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1996) (stating "[w]hen any
man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of
fornication, which is a misdemeanor).
141. See Keane, supra note 93, at 507-08. Keane argues that given the dual na-
ture of marriage as both a discreet act and an ongoing legal relationship, the law
of the state where the marriage occurred should apply to the lawfulness of the
marriage itself. The marrying state has an intent to regulate the validity of the
marriage. While the law of the domiciliary state should apply to the relationship
itself given the domiciliary state's interest in regulating the ongoing relationship
of its citizens. See id. at 507.
142. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586,
592 (1947).
143. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 subd. 1 (b). The statute provides:
A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either under com-
mon law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign juris-
diction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. The difficulty gay persons have terminating their relationships is one of
the more important aspects of gay marriage. Whereas heterosexual spouses may
rely upon divorce proceedings to equitably put an end to their relationships, ho-
mosexual couples are, for the most part, left to sort things out on their own, using
a costly smorgasbord of judicial remedies including conciliation court, unlawful
detainer, restraining orders and other remedies in the district courts. See Wolf-
son, supra note 59, at 584.
145. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4063 (Jan. 20, 1998).
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Ments."
1 4 6
Although full faith and credit has not been historically applied
to marriage, it has been uniformly applied to divorce decrees. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause of United States Constitution
"requires" that a state "must" give the same final effect to divorce
decree as was given in the state where the dissolution occurred. 1
47
There is no public policy exception here as full faith and credit or-
ders submission by a state even to "hostile" policies reflected in the
judgment of another state. 14s Thus it has been said that the re-
quirements of full faith and credit, "so far as judgments are con-
cerned, are exacting, if not inexorable...
Not surprisingly then, Minnesota uniformly affords full faith
and credit to final judgments of divorce entered in other states
provided the state had personal and subject matter jurisdiction.1 50
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court another state court's
findings and decree of divorce is, "[w]ithout doubt... a final and
conclusive adjudication, valid anywhere.... ." ' This is true even if
Minnesota does not approve of the other state's marriage and di-
vorce policies. 52 Yet, pursuant to Minnesota's DOMA, the state will
not enforce "contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage or
its termination."'5  It is unclear whether "contractual rights" in-
cludes legal obligations resulting from a divorce judgment. If so,
clearly that portion of DOMA is unconstitutional.
The practical consequences of not recognizing obligations
arising from a decree of divorce are apparent and fraught with dis-
aster. If Minnesota's DOMA is interpreted to allow the state to ref-
use to credit ajudgment for child custody154 and support or spousal
maintenance, or even if it is strictly interpreted to concern contrac-
146. Id. at 4064 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
147. Bogen v. Bogen, 261 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1977).
148. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
149. Id.
150. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(relying upon Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928)).
151. Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 366, 24 N.W.2d 711, 713 (1946).
152. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1948); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302-03 (1942).
153. MiNN. STAT. § 517.03 subd. 1(b) (Supp. 1998).
154. Prior to the enactment of the Parental Kidnapping and Parentage Act
and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Minnesota did not
afford full faith and credit to child custody orders, but recognized them as a mat-
ter of comity. Barker v. Barker, 286 Minn. 314, 315, 176 N.W.2d 99, 101 (1970)
(citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)).
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tual rights, individuals wishing to avoid their marital responsibili-
ties, be it the marriage itself or obligations arising from the termi-
nation of the marriage, will simply move to this state (or any other
state with similar laws), and the state, in turn, will reward the
scoundrel by refusing to recognize the marriage and further, by re-
fusing to give effect to any obligations arising thereunder. 15' The
problems this anomaly could create are absolutely staggering.
C. Minnesota's Choice of Law Rules Regarding Marriage
As previously indicated, Minnesota's common law choice of
law rules have a greater bearing on whether the state would recog-
nize same-sex marriages entered into in another state than does
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
In Minnesota, the validity of marriage has for over a century been
determined by applying the law of the place where the marriage
was contracted."' A marriage valid according to the law where it
was performed, be it another state or a foreign country, will be
valid in Minnesota. ' This is true even if the parties were mere so-
journers in the place where the marriage took place 158 or if they
purposefully left the state to evade its marriage laws.5 This rule,
which is commonly referred to as lex loci contractus or celebrationis,'6 '
recognizes that it is "obviously essential to the welfare of mankind
that a marriage valid in one place should be valid everywhere."'1'
Conversely, a marriage void where it was celebrated is void in Min-
nesota as well.
162
An exception to the general celebration rule exists, however, if
155. Strasser, supra note 89, at 321.
156. See, e.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 261 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1977) (recognizing
marriage of persons domiciled in Minnesota if marriage is valid under the law of
the state where it was contracted); Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 362-63, 44 N.W.
254, 255 (1890) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS §
283(2) (1971) (stating "[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state
where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it
violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.").
157. See In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 95, 235 N.W. 529, 531 (1931);
In re Lando's Estate, 112 Minn. 257, 261-62, 127 N.W. 1125, 1126 (1910) (applying
German law to determine marriage was valid).
158. SeeLando's Estate, 112 Minn. at 262, 127 N.W. at 1126.
159. See Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. at 96, 235 N.W. at 531.
160. Johnson v.Johnson, 214 Minn. 462, 467, 8 N.W.2d 620, 622-23 (1943).
161. Lando's Estate, 112 Minn. at 262, 127 N.W. at 1126.
162. See id. at 261, 127 N.W. at 1126.
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the marriage violates a "strong public policy" of the domicile of the
parties.163 "[P]ublic policy does not mean simply sound policy or
good policy, but it means the laws of the state, whether found in
our Constitution, statutes or our judicial records."'6 Marriages de-
clared absolutely void by the Minnesota legislature demonstrate
such a strong public policy.165 This is to be distinguished from stat-
utes which simply prohibit certain marriages. If the statute does
not expressly declare the marriage invalid, the Minnesota Supreme
Court will not find that there is a strong public policy reason to in-
166validate a marriage lawfully contracted elsewhere. But even this
principle, which seems straight-forward enough, has not been uni-
formly applied or followed.
To demonstrate, Minnesota abolished common law marriages
in 1941 by statute.16' Thus, common law marriages contracted on
or before April 26, 1941, are recognized as valid, and those con-
tracted thereafter are not. In Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, interpreting this statute, held that
common law marriages cannot be consummated by Minnesota
residents who temporarily visit a state that allows common law mar-
riage. 16 However, The Laikola court also held that Minnesota will
recognize common law marriages under certain circumstances.
69
While the former holding is entirely consistent with the celebration
rule, the latter holding is entirely inconsistent with the public pol-
icy exception to the celebration rule. The Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized that common law marriages consummated after
a certain date, having been deemed to be null and void by the leg-
islature, are against public policy, but held that Minnesota will rec-
ognize them if the couple resided (more than temporarily) in a
163. See Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. 1979).
164. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 227, 234 N.W. 314, 315 (1931).
165. See In re Kinkead's Estate, 239 Minn. 27, 30, 57 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1953)
(holding marriage valid by law of place contracted, valid everywhere unless it vio-
lates public policy of the state of domicile).
166. See id. at 35-37, 57 N.W.2d at 632-35 (holding that state's prohibition on
marriages contracted within six months after either party has been divorced does
not invalidate a marriage of Minnesota residents and citizens contracted in Iowa,
even where the Iowa marriage license was procured through fraud and perjury);
see also Bogen v. Bogen, 261 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1977) (same).
167. See MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1996) (abolishing common law marriage).
168. Laikola, 277 N.W.2d at 656.
169. See e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977); Laikola, 277
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170state that recognizes common law marriage.
What then to make of the state DOMA provisions? The Min-
nesota legislature has declared same-sex marriages null and void,
disposing of the issue of whether same-sex marriages are contrary
to the state's public policy. However, it appears that under Laikola
Minnesota should nevertheless recognize a same-sex marriage if
the couple resided in the state which married them and met all of
that state's requirements for marriage. Thus, according to Minne-
sota's common law, same-sex couples who reside and marry in Ha-
waii could later move to Minnesota and expect that their marriage
would be honored. This is apparently true even if the couple pur-
posefully fled from Minnesota to escape its marriage laws, as long
as the couple resided in Hawaii at the time of the marriage.
But for the statutory conclusion that same-sex marriage is con-
trary to the public policy of Minnesota, it is questionable whether
the state could establish a true basis for concluding that same-sex
marriage is contrary to the "strong" public policy of this state. The
typical reasons cited for prohibiting same-sex marriages are to fos-
ter procreation, encourage morality and maintain family stability.'
If the state has a sodomy statute, it is also argued that allowing
same-sex marriage would conflict with the prohibition on homo-
sexual acts. 172 Indeed, all of these reasons, explicitly or implicitly,
were argued by proponents of Minnesota's DOMA on the House
and Senate Floors. None of these justifications, however, bear
close scrutiny.
Marriage, in Minnesota or any other state, has never been re-
served for those couples who intend to or are physically able to
procreate.173 Senator Spear correctly argued on the Senate floor
170. See Laikola, 277 N.W.2d at 658.
171. See Curt Pham, Let's Get Married in Hawaii: A Story of Conflicting Laws, Same-
Sex Couples, and Marriage, 30 FAM. L.Q. 727, 733 (Fall 1996).
172. See id.
173. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at 579. Wolfson states:
[l]n America today, marriage is not a mere dynastic or property ar-
rangement; it is not best understood as a tool or creature of the state or
church; and it is not simply, primarily, or necessarily about parenting, let
alone procreation. Whatever the history, today marriage is first and
foremost about a loving union between two people who enter into a rela-
tionship of emotional and financial commitment and interdependence,
two people who seek to make a public statement about their relation-
ship, sanctioned by the state, the community at large, and, for some,
their religious community. And that concept of marriage, no more and
no less, should hold for gay people seeking to marry. (citations omitted).
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that the ability to marry in Minnesota is in no way limited to indi-
viduals who intend to have children. 7 4 Persons who are infertile or
who simply do not intend to have children are nevertheless legally
entitled to be married. Senator Spear argued that we celebrate the
marriage of elderly persons because of the companionship and
emotional support which flow from the marriage, not because we• 175
expect that children will be born of the marriage. It is simply dis-
ingenuous to deny same-sex couples the right to marry based upon
a procreation argument when procreation plays no role in the de-
cision to allow opposite-sex couples to marry. Moreover, many
same-sex couples do in fact give birth to and raise children, be they
176through former relationships, adoption or artificial means.
It is difficult to see how banning same-sex marriage encourages
morality. Allowing persons of the same sex to marry, an act which
promotes "a way of life," "harmony in living" and "bilateral loy-
alty," 1 77 actually encourages monogamy in a class which is often
criticized for being promiscuous. Minnesota also statutorily pro-
tects homosexuals from discrimination, 7 but relying on the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act to support same-sex marriage is fraught
with difficulty. Significantly, the Act specifically provides that noth-
ing in it should be construed to mean that the state condones ho-
mosexuality or authorizes the recognition of same-sex marriage.
179
Opponents of same-sex marriage will likely point to Minne-
sota's sodomy law in support of their argument that same-sex mar-
riage is contrary to the state's public policy.1 8 0 In Bowers v. Hard-
174. See Partial Audiotape of Senate Floor, S.F. 1908, Tape 2, Side A, 80th Ses-
sion (May 16, 1997).
175. Id.
176. The number of children raised in households with gay or lesbian parents
ranges from six to fourteen million. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at 577 n.44.
177. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
178. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01 subd. 45 (Supp. 1998). In 1993, the legislature
amended the Minnesota Human Rights Act to protect persons from discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. The statute currently defines sexual orien-
tation as:
having or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual at-
tachment to another person without regard to the sex of that person or
having or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment,
or having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not tradi-
tionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. 'Sexual
orientation' does not include a physical or sexual attachment to children
by an adult.
Id.
179. MINN. STAT. § 363.021(1) & (4) (Supp. 1998).
180. See MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987).
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wick, the United States Supreme Court held that the belief of the
majority of the population that homosexual sodomy is immoral
and unacceptable provides a rational basis for sodomy statutes.18
The sodomy argument is not particularly compelling because Min-
nesota's sodomy law does not differentiate between homosexual
and heterosexual conduct,
s' and the statute is rarely enforced.
l
11
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the attributes of marriage go well beyond the act of consum-
mating the marriage. In Turner v. Safley,18 4 in which the Court
found marriage to be a fundamental right of prison inmates under
Zablocki, marriage was trumpeted as an important expression of
emotional support and public commitment. 15 The court further
noted that to many persons marriage has a spiritual significance
and may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of
personal dedication. 16 Marriage, the Supreme Court also recog-
nized, is often a precondition to the receipt of important govern-
mental benefits, property rights, and other less tangible benefits,.. . .. 187
such as the legitimization of children born out of wedlock. Thus,
governmental recognition of same-sex marriage should not be
viewed as moral approval, but a recognition that the rights of ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals are equal when it comes to confer-
ring important financial and legal benefits.'88
As was ably demonstrated in Hawaii, proper child-rearing and
family stability do not depend upon the sex or sexual orientation of
the parents, but upon the nurturing relationship which develops
between parents and child.' s9 There is a wide diversity in the struc-
ture and configuration of families throughout this nation. Single
parents, gay and lesbian parents, and other non-traditional parents
can be and are as fit and loving parents as are opposite-sex cou-
ples.190 Moreover, as the Baehr court recognized, allowing same-sex
marriage may actually have a positive effect on the optimal devel-
181. See478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
182. See State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 402, 237 N.W.2d 609, 615 (1975)
(stating that the fact that a person is a homosexual does not constitute a crime).
183. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2.
184. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
185. See id. at 95-96.
186. See id. at 96.
187. See id.
188. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at 615.
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opment of children because same-sex couples may then be able to
obtain certain protections and benefits that come with or become
available as a result of marriage.'9'
Finally, same-sex marriage is different and distinct from other
marriages prohibited by chapter 517 of the Minnesota Statutes,
which seeks, among other things, to protect such presumptively
vulnerable persons as children and close family members.9 There
is nothing presumptively vulnerable about an adult who simply
wishes to marry someone of the same sex. 193 For this reason, the
ban on same-sex marriage is much more closely analogous to the
now unconstitutional ban on interracial marriages in that the true
reason for the legislation stems from prejudice, fear or a sense of
morality rather than any rational concern for the persons entering
into the relationship.
As a matter of public policy, Minnesota's DOMA, like its fed-
eral counterpart, is a disaster because there is no compelling rea-
son for banning same-sex marriage. "Rather, there is an emotional
repugnance to homosexuality that is overwhelming rational con-
sideration of this issue." 95 DOMA "promotes bigotry, undermines
the stability and certainty of marriage, hurts innocent individuals,
and provides a relatively easy way for individuals to avoid their
marital responsibilities. " 9r "The Act would be laughable were its
effects not so potentially dangerous and tragic.
"197
VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND THE MINNESOTA
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
Perhaps one of the strongest, and most overlooked, challenges
to DOMA legislation is based upon each citizen's fundamental con-
stitutional right to interstate travel.'98 The United States Supreme
Court has long recognized that the very nature of the United States
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty "unite to re-
quire that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
191. Seeid. at*18.
192. See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 89, at 1442.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at 614 (quoting State Should Drop Ban on Same-
Sex Marriage, STAR BULL. (Honolulu), Feb. 4,1994, at A12).
196. See Strasser, supra note 89, at 323.
197. See id.
198. See State v. Cuypers, 559 N.W.2d 435, 436-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966)).
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breadth of the land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." This
freedom of travel, whatever its constitutional origins, ° "includes
the freedom to enter and abide in any state."2' 1 Minnesota may not
rely on the federal DOMA to justify any burden on the right to in-
terstate travel because "Congress ma not authorize the States to
violate the Equal Protection Clause."
It has been said that the personal right to travel is
"unconditional,",2°' and implicated when a statute (1) actually deters
such travel, (2) when impeding travel is its primary objective, or (3)
when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right.204 If a statute implicates the right to travel in a meaning-
ful and significant way, the state must show a compelling state in-
terest to justify the legislation. The state must show more than that
the legislation is rationally related to a governmental objective be-
cause the right to travel is fundamental. "In reality, right to travel
analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal
protection analysis.
2 0 6
In Mitchell v. Steffen, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
whether a six-month durational residency requirement for full
general assistance work readiness benefits burdened the funda-
mental right to travel even if newly arrived state residents could re-
ceive benefits equal to those they were eligible to receive in their
207former state. The court first determined that there was no evi-
199. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
200. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 758. The Guest court stated, "[a]lthough the Arti-
cles of Confederation provided that 'the people of each State shall have free in-
gress and egress to and from any other State', the right to travel finds no explicit
mention in the United States Constitution." Id. Indeed, there has been a signifi-
cant amount of debate concerning the constitutional origins of this right, which is
now roundly recognized as being fundamental. Some trace it to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, others to the Commerce Clause, some from both, and
still others from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 630 n.8; Guest, 383 U.S. at 762-75 (Harlan,J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
201. See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 189, 210 N.W.2d 221, 223 (1973) (citing
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)).
202. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641.
203. See id. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring).
204. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Minn. 1993).
205. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; Davis, 297 Minn. at 191, 210 N.W.2d at 224
(citations omitted).
206. See Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 200 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60
n.6 (1981)).
207. See id. at 199-200.
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dence that the six-month durational residency requirement de-
terred migration or sought to impede travel into the state. 208 Indi-
gent newcomers to the state were no worse off than they were in
their former state because the benefits provided by Minnesota
would remain the same as those provided by the indigent's former
state.209 Thus, although the purpose of the statute was to conserve
the public fisc, it was intended to save money without deterring an
indigent's decision to travel . Because the Mitchell Court con-
cluded that the durational residency requirement did not deter
travel and did not have the purpose of impeding travel, it consid-
ered whether the legislation used a classification to penalize a per-
son's right to travel.
"[A] state may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a
right guaranteed by the Constitution." 21 2 When considering
whether a statute unconstitutionally penalizes a person's funda-
mental right to travel, the Minnesota Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the severity of the penalty is relevant in determining
the constitutionality of the legislation; the greater the penalty, the
closer the scrutiny. 1 "Penalize," as used in this context, does not
mean to sanction or to punish, but rather to suffer some disadvan-
tage, loss or hardship. Not every penalty on interstate travel will
trigger the compelling state interest test, and the court may weigh
the harshness of the penalty when determining whether there has
been a denial of equal protection.21 5 "[T]he question is not so
much whether the right to travel has been 'violated,' but whether
the right to travel has been so burdened by [the legislation] that
the statute's classification requires strict scrutiny rather than mini-
mal rational basis analysis."
21 6




212. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 341 (1972) (quoting Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)).
213. See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 191, 210 N.W.2d 221, 224 (1973).
214. See Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 202 (citing Cole v. Hous. Auth. of City of New-
port, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970)).
215. See Davis, 297 Minn. at 192, 210 N.W.2d at 225; see also Starns v. Malker-
son, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding
Minnesota's one-year residency requirement for qualifying for in-state tuition de-
spite the fact that it constituted a penalty on interstate travel and is difficult to
find any compelling state interest to justify it).
216. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 200.
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The Mitchell court concluded that the statute clearly failed un-
der this test because the durational residency requirement divided
residents into two classes, old residents and new residents, and dis-
criminated against the latter on the basis of their recent travel." 7
The court reached its conclusion even though there is no constitu-
tional requirement that the state provide welfare benefits in any
amount, let alone an adequate amount.21 Although the Mitchell
court recognized that the right to travel might more appropriately
focus on interstate travel itself and not on what happens after the
travel has ended, it concluded that the right to travel includes a
"right to abide in any state" without being disadvantaged because
219of that choicer. In short, if the state decides to provide welfare
benefits, the right to travel mandates that it distribute the benefits
equally to its similarly situated needy residents, without distinguish-
ing between them on the basis of the duration of their residency.22
In Davis v. Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court, considering
the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited the granting of a
divorce unless the plaintiff had resided in the state for a period of
one year immediately prior to the filing of the complaint, reached
the opposite result.22 1 The Court concluded that the interest af-
fected by the durational residency requirement in the divorce stat-
ute was much less urgent than those interests affected by the dura-
tional residency requirements in the cases relied upon by the
plaintiff, namely, the right of individuals to subsist, to survive and
222to vote. The Davis court applied the rational basis test rather
than the compelling interest test based upon its conclusion that the
ultimate right to divorce was simply delayed by the legislation and
that no economic prejudice resulted from the durational residency
requirement because an action for support and maintenance could
be brought immediately. 223 The divorce statute was upheld because
217. See Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 199. The statute provided needy residents of
Minnesota, who had resided in the state less than six months, only 60% of the
work-readiness benefits that other, equally needy residents of the state received.
Id.
218. See id. at 203.
219. Id. at 201 (citing Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338).
220. See id. at 203.
221. See 297 Minn. 187, 194, 210 N.W.2d 221, 226 (1973).
222. See id. at 193, 210 N.W.2d at 225 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (involving the denial of welfare benefits to persons who had not re-
sided in the state for one year); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 330 (involving a one-year dura-
tional residency requirement for voter registration)).
223. See Davis, 297 Minn. at 194-95, 210 N.W.2d at 226.
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it was rationally related to the state's legitimate goal of limiting the
access of nonresidents to Minnesota courts and of compelling non-
residents to apply to their own state's courts for 
relief.2
Unlike the legislation at issue in Mitchell, it appears certain that
Minnesota's Defense of Marriage legislation will actually deter
travel and migration into the state. To make this determination,
there need not be a finding that the statute actually deters travel;
the test is whether it is reasonable to infer that individuals would be
discouraged from migrating. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal involving a same-sex couple,Julie and Sarah, lawfully married in
Hawaii shortly after the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's decision in Baehr
Julie works for a national company, and Sarah is self-employed
and works at home so that she can raise their son, John, who
Sarah gave birth to during the marriage as a result of in vitro
fertilization. Julie's employer provides benefits, including
health insurance, to Sarah and John. Five years after their mar-
riage, Julie's company offers her a substantial promotion, but
the promotion will require Julie's family to relocate in Minne-
sota.
If Julie and Sarah's family moves to Minnesota, however, they
will no longer constitute a family in the legal sense of the word.
226
Sarah and Julie's marriage will be declared null and void. Julie's
employer will no longer be required to provide benefits and health
insurance to Sarah and John. If Sarah is hospitalized, Julie will
have no inherent right to visit her in the hospital, let alone to make
important decisions about Sarah's course of treatment. Finally, if
Sarah dies intestate, her property will pass to her next-of-kin, and
John will be an orphaned "bastard," and will become a ward of the227
state. Query whether Sarah and Julie will hesitate to migrate to
224. See id. at 195-196, 210 N.W.2d at 227 (citing Bechtel v. Bechtel, 101 Minn.
511, 514, 112 N.W. 883, 884 (1907)).
225. See Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 202; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (1969)
(stating that "[a]n indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and
start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the
move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his
first year of residence, when his need may be most acute.").
226. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 subd. 1 (b) (Supp. 1998).
227. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948) (noting that a state's inter-
est in the marital status of its domicilliaries extends "throughout the farthest
reaches of the nation," and that children born of a marriage legally valid in one
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Minnesota under such circumstances. Query whether Minnesota's
Defense of Marriage legislation deters their fundamental right to
interstate travel and to take up residence in Minnesota.
The obvious deterrent effect of Minnesota's DOMA is much
more apparent than in those United States Supreme Court cases
where the court rejected the states' claims that there was no evi-
dence of a deterrent effect. In cases like Shapiro and Memorial Hos-
pital, the Supreme Court found a deterrent effect based solely on
the possibility that something bad might happen to a person after
the person migrates to another state. With DOMA, on the other
hand, the deterrent effect is not just contingent, it is quite real.
Minnesota's marriage laws will strip same-sex spouses of their mari-
tal relationship, period. Even if a same-sex couple whose marriage
was nullified by the state experienced no tangible repercussions as
a result of the nullification, the intangible effects of nullification
are great. Even the staunchest heterosexual proponents of DOMA
would have to concede that they would hesitate to move to a state
that refused to recognize their marriage even if there were no ac-
tual, measurable consequences which would result from non-
recognition.
It appears also that one of the purposes of the state Defense of
Marriage Act was to impede same-sex couples from moving to
Minnesota. The legislature not only declared that marriages en-
tered into in this state must be between persons of the opposite
sex, it went on to legislate that marriages between same-sex couplesS 229
married elsewhere will not be recognized here. The fact that the
legislature passed this law in the wake of the trial court's decision
in Baehr sanctioning same-sex marriage seems to be persuasive evi-
dence that it sought to deter the in-migration of same-sex couples
from Hawaii, a patently unconstitutional purpose.
Finally, the Minnesota Defense of Marriage legislation creates
two classes of residents who were married pursuant to another
state should not carry the stigma of bastardy when they move somewhere else).
228. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (holding that an indigent who wishes to
migrate will hesitate if he knows he must risk moving without the possibility of ob-
taining state welfare assistance during his first year of residence); Memorial Hosp.
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1974) (stating that person suffering
from serious respiratory illness might be deterred from moving to Arizona be-
cause of state's twelve-month residency requirement for indigents to be eligible
for non-emergency medical care).
229. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (Supp. 1998).
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state's laws: opposite-sex spouses and same-sex spouses."s On the
basis of this sole classification, the first class is granted, and the sec-
231ond class is denied, all of the rights and privileges of marriage.
Denial of these rights and privileges is not a temporary penalty, like
those reviewed in the durational residency requirement cases; it is a
permanent penalty.2s2 Travel to Minnesota is permitted for same-
sex couples, but only at a hefty price-the absolute denial of a
couple's otherwise lawful marriage. Minnesota's Defense of Mar-
riage legislation forever strips same-sex spouses of their marital
status and all of the rights and privileges which go along with it
upon moving to Minnesota. A similarly situated opposite-sex cou-
ple may relocate in Minnesota with absolutely no change to their
relationship, status, rights or privileges.
Proponents of DOMA will likely argue that DOMA does not
implicate the right to travel and that the durational residency re-
quirement cases do not apply to a DOMA question. Proponents
will stress that Minnesota is not denying same-sex marriage to per-
sons because they have chosen to travel; instead, Minnesota prohib-
234its same-sex marriage across the board. In other words, DOMA
does not penalize travel because it does not require newcomers to
accept a status inferior to that of other Minnesota residents.2 5
Strasser argues convincingly that this argument is facile:
[A]ppearances notwithstanding, the state would not be
treating domicilliaries and nondomicilliaries in the same
230. See id. subd. 1.
231. Rights and benefits of marriage in Minnesota include a variety of state
income tax advantages, including deductions, credits, rates, exemptions and esti-
mates; public assistance; control, division, acquisition, and disposition of marital
property; rights relating to hospital access and decisions regarding medical care
and treatment; rights relating to inheritance; award of child custody and support
and spousal support in divorce proceedings; the benefit of spousal privilege and
confidential marital communications; and the right to bring a wrongful death ac-
tion or one for loss of consortium. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 540.
232. This penalty is akin to but even more substantial than a state's denial of
certain benefits to nonresident veterans. See Attorney General of New York v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911-12 (1986) (striking down New York's statute which
permanently deprived nonresident veterans of their benefits).
233. Cf Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867) (finding that a one dollar tax
imposed for passing through Nevada, while not truly depriving a citizen of any
valuable right, was an unconstitutional violation of the right to interstate travel).
234. See MiNN. STAT. § 517.03, subd. 1 (Supp. 1998).
235. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.12 (1972) (hypothesizing that
there is no penalty and a different constitutional question is presented where an
interstate migrant loses his driver's license as a result of the new state's higher age
requirement because all residents are treated alike).
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way. When a state passes legislation declaring a particular
marriage void, it prevents its domicilliaries from contract-
ing a marriage of that type. A couple domiciled in a state
where such marriages are void could not make plans and
develop expectations based on the good faith belief that
their marriage, solemnized in another state, would be
treated as valid by the domicile. However, the situation is
quite different where the domicile does recognize such a
marriage, since couples living there would have ajustified,
good faith belief that they had a valid marriage. It would
be both understandable and appropriate for them to
make plans, develop expectations, and enter into binding
236legal agreements based on their marriage.
Allowing states to invalidate previously valid marriages frus-
trates the reasonable expectations of the parties, alters the status of
their children, clouds title to their property, and places third-party
creditors in a tenuous position.237
Arguments may be made that DOMA does not unconstitution-
ally penalize same-sex couples' right to travel because no court has
ever found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage and because
the state has wide discretion in framing the qualifications for mar-. 238
nage. However, there is no right to welfare assistance, yet the
courts have recognized that if the state provides welfare it must do
so in a manner which does not penalize a person's right to travel.23 9
DOMA forces married same-sex couples to choose between travel-
ing to Minnesota and their marriage, because they cannot have
240both. Surely this is a penalty of such magnitude that it requires
strict scrutiny, the most exacting constitutional analysis.
In conclusion, a person domiciled and legally married in one
state should not be allowed to suffer the penalties of another state
simply by virtue of crossing a state line. As Justice Jackson has
noted,
If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect
236. Strasser, supra note 89, at 309-10.
237. See id. at 311.
238. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
239. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Minn. 1993).
240. Minnesota's DOMA discourages same-sex spouses from even traveling
through the state. See Strasser, supra note 89, at 308-09 (discussing ramifications for
same-sex spouses involved in a motor vehicle accident while traveling through a
state which refuses to give effect to any right or claim arising from a same-sex
marriage, including the loss of the rights to have input concerning medical treat-
ment, to bring a wrongful death action, and to seek loss of consortium damages).
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from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable in-
dividuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to
whom. Today many people who have simply lived in
more than one state do not know, and the most learned
lawyer cannot advise them with any confidence. The un-
certainties that result are not merely technical, nor are
they trivial; they affect fundamental rights and relations
such as the lawfulness of their cohabitation, their chil-
dren's legitimacy, their title to property, and even
whether they are law-abiding persons or criminals. In a
society as mobile and nomadic as ours, such uncertainties
affect large numbers of people and create a social prob-
lem of some magnitude.
Even under the analysis that Justice Rehnquist would apply in
right to travel cases, i.e., "whether the challenged requirement
erects a real and purposeful barrier to movement, or the threat of
such a barrier, or whether the effects on travel, viewed realistically,
are merely incidental and remote,"2 42 the Minnesota Defense of
Marriage Act is patently unconstitutional.
VIII. REEXAMINING BAKER How ROMERAFFECTS EQUAL
PROTECTION FOR HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MINNESOTA DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT
Given the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Baker v Nel-
son, it would seem that challenging the state's DOMA on equal pro-
tection grounds would be one of the least viable alternatives. Baker
establishes, after all, that there is no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage and, although its analysis is extremely vague and conse-
quently weak, that the state has a rational basis for prohibitingS 243
same-sex marriage. The Minnesota Supreme Court would likely
hesitate to overturn this precedent. This is not to say, however,
that an equal protection challenge is not warranted. DOMA raises
equal protection concerns wholly apart from those considered in
Baker. Moreover, Baker did not challenge Minnesota's marriage
laws on the basis of sex, as Baehr did so successfully. 44 Finally, the
241. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
242. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 285 (1974).
243. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
244. When considering whether a gender-based classification survives consti-
tutional scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Minnesota Supreme Court will consider whether the classification
serves "important governmental objectives" and is "substantially related to
1998]
41
Betlach: The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
United States Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans 45 adds
fuel to the equal protection fire and ably demonstrates that the
courts' treatment of gay and lesbian issues is evolving.
When considering whether DOMA violates equal protection
under either the state or federal constitution, the most important
question will be what standard applies-rational basis, strict scru-
tiny or something in between. While Baker presumptively estab-
lishes that the state has a rational basis for prohibiting same-sex
marriage, Baehr teaches that the state would almost certainly fail to
meet the strict scrutiny test. It also seems likely, based upon the ut-
ter failure of the state's case in Baehr, that Minnesota would not be
able to meet its burden if an intermediate standard were applied.
It is highly unlikely that either the United States or Minnesota Su-
preme Courts will find that there is a fundamental right to same-
sex marriage. Thus, if strict scrutiny is to apply, it will have to
originate from some other source.
An equal protection challenge under the federal rational basis
test requires only that the state have a "legitimate purpose for the
challenged legislation" and that it "was reasonable for the lawmak-
ers to believe that use of the challenged classification would pro-
mote that purpose."247 If a statute treats classes of persons differ-
ently, the attempted classification "must always rest upon some
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in
respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be
made arbitrarily and without any such basis."2 4 By requiring that
the classification bear a rational relationship to an independent
and legitimate legislative end, the courts ensure that classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law.249 These minimal requirements are grounded in
achievement of those objectives." State ex rel. Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d
748, 750 (Minn. 1981) (citations omitted).
245. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
246. See MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2. Equal protection is confirmed in the Minne-
sota Constitution as an "unenumerated right." Article 1, section 2 provides in part:
"No member of this State shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights
or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the
judgment of his peers."
247. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (Minn. 1991) (citing Western &
S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981)).
248. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928) (citation
omitted).
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the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal
courts no power to impose upon the states their views of what con-
stitutes wise economic or social policy.
2 5 °
Federal strict scrutiny, on the other hand, requires the state to
demonstrate that the law at issue is "supported by sufficiently im-
portant state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests."2 51 "Discriminations of an unusual character espe-
cially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision."2 52 "If the adverse impact
on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its im-
partiality would be suspect. 25 KLaws which single out a class of citi-
zens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare be-
cause "[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of equalities."25 4 "A law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for
all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense."2
Minnesota does not follow and does not consider itself bound
256by the federal equal protection rational basis test. Instead, since
the late seventies and early eighties, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has articulated the following requirements when considering equal
protection:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within
the classification from those excluded must not be mani-
festly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and sub-
stantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis
to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and
needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant
to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident
connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the
class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of
the statute must be one that the state can legitimately at-
250. See id. at 175.
251. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
252. Louisville Gas &Elec. Co., 277 U.S. at 37-38.
253. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181.
254. Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
255. Id. at 1628.
256. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (stating that statu-
tory distinctions drawn between the quantity of crack cocaine and the quantity of
cocaine powder possessed violates both the Federal and State Constitution be-
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tempt to achieve. 25'
In short, the state's equal protection clause requires that persons
similarly situated be treated alike unless a sufficient basis exists for
258discriminating among them. Minnesota courts, unlike the fed-
eral courts, will not "hypothesize" a rational basis to justify a classi-
fication. 59
With respect to strict scrutiny, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has expressly rejected and criticized federal equal protection analy-
sis, describing as "virtually insurmountable" the federal courts' re-
quirement that the challenger prove that the legislature enacted
the particular statute "'because of" not merely "in spite of" an an-
ticipatory discriminatory effect. 60 Thus, although Minnesota's con-
stitution "embodies principles of equal protection synonymous to
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United State Constitution,"261 the Minnesota Supreme Court may
nevertheless apply a more stringent standard of review when re-
262viewing legislation under the State's equal protection clause.
The question of whether the United States Supreme Court or
the Minnesota Supreme Court will treat sexual orientation as a
protected, suspect class is very much up in the air following the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, the
landmark case which invalidated Colorado's attempt to prohibit
municipalities and other governmental subdivisions from banning
discrimination in many transaction and activities, including hous-
ing, employment, education, public accommodations and health
and welfare services, on the basis of sexual orientation. The consti-
tutional amendment ("Amendment 2") adopted by statewide refer-
endum in 1992, repealed and rescinded non-discrimination ordi-
nances passed by Denver, Aspen and Boulder, among others, and
prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
264state or local government designed to protect homosexuals.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the constitutionality
257. Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981); see
also Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 468 (Minn. 1977).
258. See Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985).
259. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
260. Id. at 888 n.2 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)).
261. Id. at 889 n.3.
262. See id. at 889 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 461 n.6 (1980)).
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of Amendment 2 by reciting familiar law regarding equal protec-
265tion. Recognizing that the "Fourteenth Amendment's promise
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws
must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classi-
fies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to
various groups or persons," the Court stated that "if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class," it would
be upheld provided the legislation "bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.", 66 However, the Supreme Court opted to put
aside these traditional principles of equal protection analysis, con-
cluding that Amendment 2 "defies, even this conventional in-
quiry. 26 1 In striking down Amendment 2, the Supreme Court first
noted that Amendment 2 "has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,"
which the Court described as an "exceptional" and "invalid" form
268of legislation. As the Supreme Court recognized, by virtue of
Amendment 2,
[h]omosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both private
and governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws
from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protec-
tion from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it
forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies. 269
The Court held that Amendment 2 was unprecedented in Ameri-
can jurisprudence because it identified persons by a single trait and
denied this class of persons specific protections of the law across
the boardY.
The Court next concluded that Amendment 2 was borne of
271animus, and nothing else. It rejected the state's primary argu-
ment in defense of Amendment 2-that it put gays and lesbians in
the same position as all other persons and did nothing more than
deny homosexuals special rights-calling the argument
"implausible." 27 2 In addition, the Court stated "[I]f the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,




269. Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1625.
270. See id. at 1628.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 1624.
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it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a po-
litically unpogular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmen-
tal interest. 2  The Court found that Amendment 2 enacted severe
consequences on gays and lesbians because it not only barred ho-
mosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that anti-
discrimination laws were meant to address, it also nullified specific
legal protections for this targeted class in both the public and pri-
vate sectors.74 In short, "[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safe-
guards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.
27
1
Amendment 2, because it provided that gays and lesbians cannot
have any particular protections under the law, inflicted on them
immediate, continuing and real injuries that belied any of its justi-
fications. 76
When considering the constitutionality of the federal and state
DOMAs, the words Justice Kennedy used to begin and to end the
Romer opinion are instructive. Justice Kennedy began his opinion
with the words,
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this
Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.' Pessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1146, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896) (dissenting
opinion). Unheeded then, those words now are under-
stood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where
277the rights of persons are at stake.
Justice Kennedy concluded that:
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to eve-
ryone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
278deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
Like Amendment 2, Minnesota's DOMA singles out homo-
sexuals and declares that they are not entitled to marry the person
of their choice.279 The federal DOMA specifically sanctions such
273. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
274. See id. at 1626 (discussing affected protections in the areas of housing,
real estate, education and employment).
275. Id. at 1627.
276. See id. at 1626-28.
277. Id. at 1623.
278. Id. at 1629 (holding that Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
279. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 subd. 1 (a)(4) (Supp. 1998).
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laws.180 Discussing the effect of Amendment 2, the Court noted
that the "special protections" which Amendment 2 sought to with-
hold were not special at all, but "protections taken for granted by
most people because they already have them or do not need
them;... protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society.",28  Clearly the right to marry is one of the
transactions most people take for granted, an endeavor that consti-
tutes ordinary civic life in a free society. The federal and state
DOMAs, like Amendment 2, classify homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
Romer commands that courts considering the constitutionality
of either the federal or state version of DOMA must look at
whether Congress or the state legislature intended to discriminate
282against homosexuals. The answer to that question is apparent: of
course they did. There can be no question that the DOMA legisla-
tion, on its face, specifically targets homosexuals who wish to marry
and prohibits them from exercising and enjoying what is for every-
one else, even felons confined to prison, a fundamental right.
Even if the legislative purpose or interest was not clear on its face,
the legislative history2 would clarify any doubt as to the true pur-
pose of the DOMAs. Although "private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, .... the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect."286 As such, the state and federal DOMAs must be
280. See I U.S.C.A. § 7 (supp. 1997); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (Supp. 1997).
281. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
282. See id. It is safe to assume, based upon the dissenting opinion in Romer,
that at least three of the Justices who presently make up the United States Su-
preme Court, would not find homosexuality a suspect class. Justice Scalia, with
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, repeatedly referred to
the status gays and lesbians have obtained over the years, deeming homosexuals
"a politically powerful minority" and an "elite class" and stating that they "possess
political power much greater than their numbers" and "enjoy enormous influence
in American media and politics." Id. at 1629, 1634, & 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. SeeTurner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
284. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
285. See Strasser, supra note 89, at 301-06 (discussing and citing statements
made during congressional deliberations on DOMA and comparing arguments
made in support of DOMA to arguments made in support of anti-miscegenation
laws); but see Brown, supra note 89, at 174-76, 182-84 (arguing that DOMA, con-
duct-based legislation is not based upon status because it applies regardless of an
individual's sexual orientation, and that DOMA was not enacted solely as a result
of animus).
286. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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struck down as being constitutionally repugnant.2
7
Equal protection generally means that the rights of all persons
must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, and the
equal protection clause applies to the exercise of all the powers of
the state which can affect the individual or the individual's prop-
erty.288 Although the federal and state governments will fully rec-
ognize opposite-sex marriages performed in Hawaii, they will not
recognize equally valid same-sex marriages based solely upon the
class of persons who seek to have their marriages recognized.
Congress has journeyed into an area of the law where it has rarely
ventured before, specifically and purposefully trampling on the
rights of homosexuals.
Similarly, Minnesota has carved out a statutory exception to its
marriage laws which is unprecedented (although Baehr was equally
unprecedented). One of the inherent rights secured to a free
people by our state equal protection clause is the inherent right to
"equal and impartial laws which govern the whole community and
each member thereof., 28 9 Justice Yetka, in a special concurrence in
State v. Russell, noted that while a legislature's power to enact legis-
lation regarding criminal penalties is broad, its power is not so
broad as to allow distinctions that have a harsher impact on minor-
ity groups, particularly when those distinctions are based on mini-
mal information.20 Justice Yetka observed, "When [the legislature]
deliberately passes laws which effectively penalize a suspect class, it
appears to me that, regardless of which equal protection standard
is applied, that action violates both the state and federal Constitu-
tions."2'
287. See Brown, supra note 89, at 175. One need look no further than Brown's
comment itself and the congressional statements cited therein. Although Brown
argues that DOMA is not based upon animus toward homosexuals, he compares
same-sex couples who wish to marry to drunken alcoholics who wish to drive. Id.
That is a false analogy. Alcoholics, although they may have a predisposition to
drinking, nevertheless choose to drive. In so doing, they put other persons lives
at stake. Homosexuals who wish to marry, on the other hand, do not pose any
physical threat, real or imagined, to society at large. Congressman Talent, whose
comments on the House floor Brown describes as "poignant," compares homo-
sexuality to polygamy and incest. Id. at 183. Both Talent and Brown refer to the
"homosexual agenda" and invoke, implicitly or explicitly, religion to justify their
positions. Id.
288. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1927).
289. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225, 14 N.W.2d 400,
405 (1944).
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Although it may be difficult to convince the Minnesota Su-
preme Court to reverse Baker and find that there is a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage, it certainly appears that both the fed-
eral and state DOMAs violate equal protection as impermissible
class legislation under Romer, purposefully singling out homosexu-
als for different, unequal treatment.
IX. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this article has been to examine the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality, as it turns out, of the Min-
nesota Defense of Marriage Act. This Act will no doubt be chal-
lenged if and when the Hawaii Supreme Court affirms the district
court in Baehr and allows same-sex marriage. Minnesota same-sex
couples will travel to Hawaii and then return to Minnesota, de-
manding that their marriages be recognized. Pursuant to the Act,
Minnesota will deny recognition of same-sex marriages, and litiga-
tion will ensue. Concurrently, there will be challenges to the fed-
eral Defense of Marriage Act and to DOMA-like legislation in other
states. Courts around the country will likely reach different results
regarding the constitutionality of DOMA and equivalent state legis-
lations. These issues may eventually be decided by the United
States Supreme Court.
Both the federal and state versions of DOMA should be struck
down as unconstitutional. The federal DOMA violates the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution in that it
hinders rather than fosters federalism, allowing states to ignore
marriages validly performed elsewhere and allowing states to disre-
gardjudgments of divorce. Because of the public policy exception
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the state DOMA probably vio-
lates full faith and credit only if Minnesota will not recognize same-
sex divorce decrees. Judgments of divorce have always been enti-
tled to full faith and credit if the state granting the divorce had the
requisite jurisdiction.
Both the state and federal versions of DOMA violate equal
protection under Romer because it is apparent that Congress and
the Minnesota legislature, in passing the Acts, intended to dis-
criminate against homosexuals. Because the Acts represent im-
permissible class legislation, singling out homosexuals for unequal
treatment, they should be found constitutionally repugnant even
under a rational basis inquiry.
Finally, Minnesota's DOMA patently impinges upon the fun-
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damental right to travel and to enter and abide in the state of one's
choosing. Not only does the state's DOMA actually deter and pe-
nalize travel by same-sex spouses, impeding travel seems to have
been one of its primary objectives. Courts will apply strict scrutiny
where the fundamental right to travel is implicated. Even if the
federal version of DOMA survives a court challenge, Minnesota
cannot constitutionally burden interstate travel.
The make-up of the United States Supreme Court at the time
DOMA is challenged, and the level of constitutional scrutiny to
which the Acts are subjected, will likely determine these hot-button
issues. If strict scrutiny or some intermediate standard applies, the
Acts will likely fail to pass constitutional muster as was ably demon-
strated in Hawaii. On the other hand, if the state and federal gov-
ernments need only show a rational basis for the Acts, they will
likely be upheld. But if the Romer majority remains, the Acts may
be found constitutionally repugnant and struck down.
The recognition of same-sex marriage in Minnesota is not a
foregone conclusion if Minnesota's DOMA is found unconstitu-
tional. Without DOMA, Minnesota is simply back to square one-
the celebration rule and its public policy exception. While Minne-
sota would not be compelled to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
applicants, it would, under Laikola, likely be compelled to recog-
nize same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii (or elsewhere) if the
spouses were residents of Hawaii at the time of their marriage. The
right to same-sex marriage in Minnesota will only be guaranteed if
Baker is reversed or if the Minnesota Supreme Court follows Ha-
waii's lead and holds that the denial of same-sex marriage consti-
tutes discrimination on the basis of sex.
If Minnesota and other states are forced to recognize same-sex
marriages performed elsewhere, it will be only a matter of time be-
fore our legislators and the general public see that same-sex mar-
riage, like interracial marriage, is nothing to be frightened about,
but something we will accept if not embrace in this democracy of
ours. And, hopefully, the prohibition on same-sex marriage and
general disdain for homosexuals will be nothing more than an em-
barrassing chapter in our nation's history.
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